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Abstract. WireGuard (Donenfeld, NDSS 2017) is a recently proposed
secure network tunnel operating at layer 3. WireGuard aims to replace
existing tunnelling solutions like IPsec and OpenVPN, while requiring
less code, being more secure, more performant, and easier to use. The
cryptographic design of WireGuard is based on the Noise framework. It
makes use of a key exchange component which combines long-term and
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values (along with optional preshared keys).
This is followed by the use of the established keys in an AEAD construc-
tion to encapsulate IP packets in UDP. To date, WireGuard has received
no rigorous security analysis. In this paper, we, rectify this. We first ob-
serve that, in order to prevent Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI)
attacks, any analysis of WireGuard’s key exchange component must take
into account the first AEAD ciphertext from initiator to responder. This
message effectively acts as a key confirmation and makes the key ex-
change component of WireGuard a 1.5 RTT protocol. However, the fact
that this ciphertext is computed using the established session key rules
out a proof of session key indistinguishability for WireGuard’s key ex-
change component, limiting the degree of modularity that is achievable
when analysing the protocol’s security. To overcome this proof barrier,
and as an alternative to performing a monolithic analysis of the entire
WireGuard protocol, we add an extra message to the protocol. This is
done in a minimally invasive way that does not increase the number
of round trips needed by the overall WireGuard protocol. This change
enables us to prove strong authentication and key indistinguishability
properties for the key exchange component of WireGuard under stan-
dard cryptographic assumptions.
Keywords: Authenticated key exchange, Cryptographic protocols, For-
mal analysis, WireGuard.
1 Introduction
WireGuard: WireGuard [11] was recently proposed by Donenfeld as a replace-
ment for existing secure communications protocols like IPsec and OpenVPN. It
has numerous benefits, not least its simplicity and ease of configuration, high per-
formance in software, and small codebase. Indeed, the protocol is implemented
in less than 4,000 lines of code, making it relatively easy to audit compared
to large, complex and buggy code-bases typically encountered with IPsec and
SSL/TLS (on which OpenVPN is based).
From a networking perspective, WireGuard encapsulates IP packets in UDP
packets, which are then further encapsulated in IP packets. This is done care-
fully so as to avoid too much packet overhead. WireGuard also offers a highly
simplified version of IPsec’s approach to managing which security transforms get
applied to which packets: essentially, WireGuard matches on IP address ranges
and associates IP addresses with static Diffie-Hellman keys. This avoids much
of the complexity associated with IPsec’s Security Associations/Security Policy
Database mechanisms.
From a cryptographic perspective, WireGuard presents an interesting design.
It is highly modular, with a key exchange phase, called the handshake, that is
presented as being clearly separated from the subsequent use of the keys in a
data transport protocol. A key feature is the one-round (or 1-RTT) nature of
the key exchange phase. The key exchange phase runs between an initiator and
a responder. It combines long-term and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman values, exclu-
sively using Curve25519 [3], and is built from the Noise protocol framework [23].
In fact, every possible pairwise combination of long-term and ephemeral values
is involved in the key computations, presumably in an effort to strengthen secu-
rity in the face of various combinations of long-term and ephemeral private key
compromise. The long-term keys are not supported by a PKI, but are instead as-
sumed to be pre-configured and known to the communicating parties (or trusted
on first use, as per SSH). The protocol specification includes an option for using
preshared keys between pairs of parties, to augment the DH-based exchange and
as a hedge against quantum adversaries. The key exchange phase relies on the
BLAKE2s hash function [2] for hashing parts of the transcript, to build HMAC
(a hash-based MAC algorithm), and for HKDF (an HMAC-based key derivation
function). The data transport protocol uses solely ChaCha20-Poly1305 as spec-
ified in RFC 7539 [22] as an AEAD scheme in a lightweight packet format. The
AEAD processing incorporates explicit sequence numbers and the receiver uses
a standard sliding window technique to deal with packet delays and reorderings.
Security of WireGuard: To the best of our knowledge, with the exception of
an initial and high-level symbolic analysis,1 WireGuard has received no rigorous
security analysis. In particular, it has not benefitted from any computational (as
opposed to symbolic) proofs. In this paper, we provide such an analysis.
We cannot prove the handshake protocol (as presented in [11]) secure because
of an unfortunate reliance on the first message sent in the subsequent data trans-
port protocol to provide entity authentication of the initiator to the responder.
Without this extra message, there is a simple Key Compromise Impersonation
(KCI) attack, violating a desirable authentication goal of the protocol. This at-
tack was already pointed out by Donenfeld in [11]. Strictly speaking, it means
that the key exchange phase is not 1-RTT (as the responder cannot safely send
data to the initiator until it has received a verified data transport message from
the initiator). We show that there is also an attack on the forward secrecy of
1 https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard-formal-verification.pdf
the protocol in the same KCI setting, similar to observations made by Krawczyk
in [18]. Such an attack recovers session keys rather than breaking authentication
properties, and is arguably more serious. However, the attack requires a partic-
ular set of compromise capabilities on the part of the attacker, so we regard it
more as a barrier to obtaining strong security proofs than as a practical attack.
On the other hand, if we take the extra message required to prevent the KCI
attack of [11] and our new attack into account, it becomes impossible to prove the
usual key indistinguishability (KI) property desired of a key exchange protocol
(and which, broadly speaking, guarantees that it can be securely composed with
subsequent use of the keys [9]). This is because the data transport protocol uses
the very keys that we would desire to prove indistinguishable from random to
AEAD-protect potentially known plaintexts. Such issues are well-known in the
analysis of real-world secure communications protocols – they are endemic, for
example, in the analysis of SSL/TLS prior to version 1.3 [21, 16, 19].
There are two basic approaches to solving this problem: analyse the entire
protocol (handshake and data transport) as a monolithic entity, or modify the
protocol to provide a proper key separation between keys used in the handshake
to provide authentication and keys used in the data transport layer. The former
approach has been successfully applied (see for example the ACCE framework
of [16]) but is complex, requires models highly tuned to the protocol, and results
in quite unwieldy proofs. The latter approach makes for easier analysis and high-
lights better what needs to be considered to be part of the key exchange protocol
in order to establish its security, but necessitates changes to the protocol.
Our contributions: In this paper, we adopt the latter approach, making mini-
mally invasive changes to WireGuard to enable us to prove its security. In more
detail, we work with a security model for key exchange based on that of Cre-
mers and Feltz [10] but extended to take into account WireGuard’s preshared
key option. The model allows us to handle a full range of security properties
in one clean sweep, including authentication, regular key indistinguishability,
forward security, and KCI attacks (including advanced forms in which key secu-
rity is considered). The model considers a powerful adversary who is permitted
to make every combination of ephemeral and honestly-generated long-term key
compromise bar those allowing trivial attacks, and who is able to interact with
multiple parties in arbitrary numbers of protocol runs.
We build a description of WireGuard’s key exchange phase that takes into
account all of its main cryptographic features, including the fine details of its
many key derivation and (partial) transcript hashing steps. However, in-line
with our choice of how to handle the KI/modularity problem, we make a small
modification to the handshake protocol, adding an extra flow from initiator to
responder which explicitly authenticates one party to the other. This job is cur-
rently fulfilled by the first packet from initiator to responder in the data transport
protocol. With this modification in place, we are then able to prove the security
of WireGuard’s key exchange protocol under fairly standard cryptographic as-
sumptions, in the standard model. Specifically, our proof relies on a PRFODH
assumption [16, 8] (alternatively, we could have chosen to work with gap-DH
and the Random Oracle Model).
Roadmap: Section 2 provides preliminary definitions, mostly focussed on secu-
rity notions for the base primitives used in WireGuard. Section 3 describes the
WireGuard handshake protocol. Section 4 presents the security model for key
exchange that we use in Section 5, where our main security result, Theorem 1,
can be found. We wrap up with conclusion and future work in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Here we formalise the security assumptions that we will be using in our analysis
of WireGuard, specifically the security assumptions for pseudo-random function
(PRF) security, for Authenticated-Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
schemes (due to space constraints, these can be found in the full version [14]).
We use an asymptotic approach, relying on primitives that are parameterised
with a security parameter λ; all our definitions and results can be made concrete
at the expense of using extended notation. In later sections, we will suppress all
dependence on λ in our naming of primitives to ease the notation.
We let G = 〈g〉 denote a finite cyclic group of prime order q that is generated
by g. We utilise different typefaces to represent distinct objects: algorithms (such
as an adversary A and a challenger C in a security game), adversarial Queries
(such as Test or Reveal), protocol and per-session variables (such as a public-key
/ secret-key pair (pk, sk), definitions for security notions (such as coll or aead),
and constant protocol values (such as InitiatorHello and ResponderHello).
We now introduce the PRFODH assumption that will be needed for our
analysis of WireGuard. The first version of this assumption was introduced by
[16] in order to prove the TLS-DHE handshake secure in the standard model.
This was subsequently modified in later works analysing real-world protocols,
such as TLS-RSA [19], the in-development TLS 1.3 [12, 13], and the Extended
Access Control Protocol [7]. This assumption was generalised in [8] in order to
capture the different variants of PRFODH in a parameterised way. We give the
formulation from [8] verbatim in the full version [14]
We extend the definition from [8] similarly to [12]: compared to [8] we allow
the adversary access to ODHu and ODHv oracles before the adversary issues the
challenge query x∗. This generalisation is necessary in our analysis of WireGuard,
because public ephemeral DH values are used to compute a salt value that is used
as an input to a PRF during the key computations. We refer to our extension
as the symmetric generic PRFODH assumption.
Definition 1 (Symmetric generic PRFODH Assumption). Let G be a cyclic
group of order q with generator g (where G, q and g all implicitly depend on λ).
Let PRFλ : G ×M → K be a function from a pseudo-random function family
that takes a group element k ∈ G and a salt value m ∈M as input, and outputs
a value y ∈ K. We define a security notion, sym-lr-PRFODH security, which is
parameterised by: l, r ∈ {n, s,m} indicating how often the adversary is allowed to
query “left” and “right” oracles (ODHu and ODHv), where n indicates that no
query is allowed, s that a single query is allowed, and m that multiple (polyno-
mially many) queries are allowed to the respective oracle. Consider the following
security game asym-lr-PRFODHPRF,A between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A,
both running on input λ.
1. The challenger C samples u, v $← Zq and provides G, g, gu, gv to A.
2. If l = m, A can issue arbitrarily many queries to oracle ODHu, and if r = m
and sym = Y to the oracle ODHv. These are implemented as follows:
– ODHu: on a query of the form (S, x), the challenger first checks if S /∈ G
and returns ⊥ if this is the case. Otherwise, it computes y ← PRFλ(Su, x)
and returns y.
– ODHv: on a query of the form (T, x), the challenger first checks if T /∈ G
and returns ⊥ if this is the case. Otherwise, it computes y ← PRFλ(T v, x)
and returns y.
3. Eventually, A issues a challenge query x∗. It is required that, for all queries
(S, x) to ODHu made previously, if S = g
v, then x 6= x∗. Likewise, it is
required that, for all queries (T, x) to ODHv made previously, if T = g
u,
then x 6= x∗. This is to prevent trivial wins by A. C samples a bit b $←
{0, 1} uniformly at random, computes y0 = PRFλ(guv, x∗), and samples y1 $←
{0, 1}λ uniformly at random. The challenger returns yb to A.
4. Next, A may issue (arbitrarily interleaved) queries to oracles ODHu and
ODHv. These are handled as follows:
– ODHu: on a query of the form (S, x), the challenger first checks if S /∈ G
or if (S, x) = (gv, x∗) and returns ⊥ if either holds. Otherwise, it returns
y ← PRFλ(Su, x).
– ODHv: on a query of the form (T, x), the challenger first checks if T /∈ G
or if (T, x) = (gu, x∗) and returns ⊥ if either holds. Otherwise, it returns
y ← PRFλ(T v, x).
5. At some point, A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
We say that the adversary wins the sym-lr-PRFODH game if b′ = b and define
the advantage function
Advsym-lr-PRFODHPRF,G,q,A (λ) = |2 · Pr(b′ = b)− 1|.
We say that the sym-lr-PRFODH assumption holds if the advantage
Advsym-lr-PRFODHPRF,G,q,A (λ) of any PPT adversary A is negligible.
3 The WireGuard Protocol
The WireGuard protocol is, as presented in [11]2, cleanly separated into two
distinct phases:
2 And in the updated version at https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf
that we rely on hereafter.
– A key exchange or handshake phase, where users exchange ephemeral elliptic-
curve Diffie-Hellman values, as well as encrypted long-term Diffie-Hellman
values and compute AEAD keys; and
– A data transport phase, where users may send authenticated and confidential
transport data under the previously computed AEAD keys.
The handshake phase is a 1-RTT protocol in which users maintain the fol-
lowing set of variables:
– A randomly-sampled session identifier IDρ for each user in the session (i.e we
use IDi to refer to the session identifier of the initiator and for the responder
we refer to IDr).
– An updating seed value Ck, is used to seed the key-derivation function at
various points during the key-exchange.
– An updating hash valueHk, is used to hash subsets of the transcript together,
to bind the computed AEAD keys to the initial key-exchange.
– A tuple of AEAD keys that are used for confidentiality of the long-term key
of the initiator, and to authenticate hash values.
– Long-term elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman keys gu, gv of initiator and respon-
der, respectively.
– Ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman keys gx, gy of initiator and respon-
der, respectively.
– Optional long-term preshared key psk.
In Figure 1 we describe the computations required to construct the key ex-
change messages, which we refer to as InitiatorHello and ResponderHello.
For conciseness, we do not include the chaining steps required to compute the
various Ck and Hk values throughout the protocol (we instead list them in Table
1). Nor do we make explicit the verification of the mac1, mac2 MAC values nor
the time, zero AEAD values, but assume that they are correctly verified before
deriving the session keys tki and tkr.
3.1 Remarks on the Protocol
As noted in the introduction (and noted by Donenfeld [11]), it is clear that Wire-
Guard’s 1-RTT handshake taken in isolation is not secure in the KCI setting.
This is because an attacker in possession of the responder’s long-term private
DH value v can construct the first protocol message and thence impersonate
the initiator to the responder. Our attack in Section 5.1 extends this authenti-
cation attack to a session key recovery attack. WireGuard protects against this
kind of KCI attack by requiring the first data transport message to be sent by
the initiator and the responder to check the integrity of this message. Strictly
speaking, then, the first data transport message should be regarded as part of
the handshake, making it no longer 1-RTT.
An attractive aspect of WireGuard (from a provable security standpoint) is
that it is “cryptographically opinionated”, meaning that the protocol has no al-
gorithm negotiation functionality — all WireGuard sessions will use Curve25519
Initiator Responder
(x, gx)
$← DHGen, epki ← gx, sidi = IDi $← {0, 1}32
ltk = AEAD(κ3, 0, g
u, H3)
now ← Timestamp()
time← AEAD.Enc(κ4, 0, H4, now)
mac1← MAC(H(label3‖gv), type‖03‖sidi‖epki‖ltk‖time)
mac2← MAC(cookie, type‖03‖sidi‖epki‖ltk‖time‖mac1)
InitiatorHello← type‖03‖sidi‖epki‖ltk‖time‖mac1‖mac2
InitiatorHello
(y, gy)
$← DHGen, epkr ← gy, sidr = IDr $← {0, 1}32
zero← AEAD.Enc(κ9, 0, H9, ∅)
mac1← MAC(H(label3‖gu), type‖03‖sidr‖sidi‖epkr‖zero)
mac2← MAC(cookie, type‖03‖sidr‖sidi‖epkr‖zero‖mac1)
ResponderHello← type‖03‖sidr‖sidi‖epkr‖zero‖mac1‖mac2
ResponderHello
tki ← KDF(C9, ∅, 1)
tkr ← KDF(C9, ∅, 2)
Fig. 1: A brief overview of the WireGuard Key-Exchange Protocol. For more
details on the computation of the chaining seed (Ck), hash (Hk) and intermediate
key (κk) values, refer to Table 1. Note that all verifications of MAC and AEAD
values are left implicit, but are obviously crucial to security.
k Seed value Ck Key κk Hash value Hk
1 H(label1) ∅ H(C1‖label2)
2 (C1, g
x, 1) ∅ H(H1‖gv)
3 (C2, g
xv, 1) (C2, g
xv, 2) H(H2‖gx)
4 (C3, g
uv, 1) (C3, g
uv, 2) H(H3‖ltk)
5 ∅ ∅ H(H4‖time)
6 (C4, g
y, 1) ∅ H(H5‖gy)
7 (C6, g
xy, 1) ∅ ∅
8 (C7, g
uy, 1) ∅ ∅
9 (C8, psk, 1) (C8, psk, 3) H(H6‖KDF(C8, psk, 2))
10 ∅ ∅ H(H9‖zero)
Table 1: A detailed look at the computation of the chaining seed (Ck) and
hash (Hk) values, as well as the intermediate AEAD keys (κk) used in the
WireGuard Key-Exchange protocol. Note that unless otherwise specified, the
triples (X,Y, Z) in the table are used in that order as the inputs to a key-
derivation function KDF(X,Y, Z) (so X is used as the keying material, Y is the
salt value and Z the index of the output key) to compute the relevant values.
Finally, we denote with ∅ values that are not used during protocol execution.
for ECDH key exchange, BLAKE2 as the underlying hash function that builds
both HMAC and HKDF, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 as the AEAD encryption
scheme. As is known from the analysis of SSL/TLS,[1, 4, 5, 15] and more gener-
ally [17], such negotiation mechanisms can lead to downgrade attacks that can
fatally undermine security especially if a protocol supports both weak and strong
cryptographic options. This decision to avoid ciphersuite negotiation simplifies
the analysis of WireGuard.
Surprisingly, the full key exchange transcript is not authenticated by either
party — the mac1 and mac2 values are keyed with public values H(label3‖gv)
and cookie and thus can be computed by an adversary. While the hash values
H3, H4 and H9 are headers in AEAD ciphertexts, these H values do not con-
tain all of the transcript information — the session identifiers sidi and sidr
are not involved in either the seed or hash chains. This then limits the options
for analysing WireGuard, as we cannot hope to show full transcript authentica-
tion properties. It would be a straightforward modification to include the session
identifiers in the derivation of the session keys and thus bind the session iden-
tifiers to the session keys themselves. One could argue that the lack of binding
between transcripts and output session keys has facilitated attacks on SSL/TLS,
such as the Triple Handshake attack [6], and so a small modification to the in-
puts of the chaining values C and hash values H would strengthen the security
of the protocol.
4 Security Model
We propose a modification to the eCK-PFS security model introduced by Cre-
mers and Feltz [10] that incorporates preshared keys and strengthens the secu-
rity definitions accordingly. We explain the framework and give an algorithmic
description of the security model in Section 4.1, and describe the corruption
abilities of the adversary in Section 4.2. We then describe the modifications
necessary to capture the exact security guarantees that WireGuard attempts
to achieve by explaining the differences between our partnering definitions and
traditional notions of partnering in Section 4.3. We then give our modified clean-
ness definitions in Section 4.4. Given that WireGuard uses a mix of long-term
identity keys, ephemeral keys and preshared secrets in its key exchange proto-
col, it is appropriate to use an extended-Canetti-Krawcyzk model (as introduced
in [20]), wherein the adversary is allowed to reveal subsets of these secrets. It is
claimed in [11] that WireGuard “achieves the requirements of authenticated key
exchange (AKE) security, avoids key-compromise impersonation, avoids replay
attacks, provides perfect forward secrecy,” [11]. These are all notions captured
by our extended eCK-PFS model, so our subsequent security proof will formally
establish that WireGuard meets its goals.
4.1 Execution Environment
Consider an experiment ExpeCK-PFS-PSKKE,nP ,nS ,A (λ) played between a challenger C and
an adversary A. C maintains a set of nP parties P1, . . . , PnP (representing users
interacting with each other via the protocol), each capable of running up to nS
sessions of a probabilistic key-exchange protocol KE, represented as a tuple of
algorithms KE = (f,ASKeyGen,PSKeyGen,EPKeyGen). We use pisi to refer to
both the identifier of the s-th instance of the KE being run by party Pi and the
collection of per-session variables maintained for the s-th instance of KE run by
Pi. We describe the algorithms below:
KE.f(λ, pki, ski, pi,m)
$→ (m′, pi′) is a (potentially) probabilistic algorithm
that takes a security parameter λ, the long-term asymmetric key pair pki, ski of
the party Pi, a collection of per-session variables pi and an arbitrary bit string
m ∈ {0, 1}∗∪{∅}, and outputs a response m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗∪{∅} and an updated per-
session state pi′, acting in accordance with an honest protocol implementation.
KE.ASKeyGen(λ)
$→ (pk, sk) is a probabilistic asymmetric-key generation
algorithm taking as input a security parameter λ and outputting a public-
key/secret-key pair (pk, sk).
KE.PSKeyGen(λ)
$→ (psk, pskid) is a probabilistic symmetric-key generation
algorithm that also takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a symmet-
ric preshared secret key psk and (potentially) a preshared secret key identifier
pskid.
KE.EPKeyGen(λ)
$→ (ek, epk) is a probabilistic ephemeral-key generation al-
gorithm that also takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs an asym-
metric public-key/secret-key pair (ek, epk).
C runs KE.ASKeyGen(λ) nP times to generate a public-key/secret-key pair
(pki, ski) for each party Pi ∈ {P1, . . . , PnP } and delivers all public-keys pki for
i ∈ {1, . . . , nP } to A. The challenger C then randomly samples a bit b $← {0, 1}
and interacts with the adversary via the queries listed in Section 4.2. Eventually,
A terminates and outputs a guess b′ of the challenger bit b. The adversary wins
the eCK-PFS-PSK key-indistinguishability experiment if b′ = b, and additionally
if the session pisi such that Test(i, s) was issued satisfies a cleanness predicate
clean, which we discuss in more detail in Section 4.4. We give an algorithmic
description of this experiment in Figure 2.
Each session maintains the following set of per-session variables:
– ρ ∈ {init, resp} – the role of the party in the current session. Note that
parties can be directed to act as init or resp in concurrent or subsequent
sessions.
– pid ∈ {1, . . . , nP , ?} – the intended communication partner, represented with
? if unspecified. Note that the identity of the partner session may be set
during the protocol execution, in which case pid can be updated once.
– ms ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} – the concatenation of messages sent by the session,
initialised by ⊥.
– mr ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} – the concatenation of messages received by the session,
initialised by ⊥.
– kid ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} – the concatenation of public keyshare information re-
ceived by the session, initialised by ⊥.
ExpeCK-PFS-PSK-indKE,clean,nP ,nS ,A(λ):
1: b
$← {0, 1}
2: tested← false
3: for i = 1 to nP do
4: (pki, ski)
$← ASKeyGen(λ)
5: ASKflagi ← clean
6: PSKi[1, . . . , nP ]← ⊥
7: PSKflagi[1, . . . , nP ]← ⊥
8: EPKflagi[1, . . . , nS ]← ⊥
9: RSKflagi[1, . . . , nS ]← ⊥
10: ctri ← 0
11: end for
12: b′ $← ACreate∗,Send,...(pk1, . . . , pknP )
13: if clean(pisi ) then
14: return (b′ = b)
15: else
16: return b′ $← {0, 1}
17: end if
Create(i, j, role):
1: ctri ← ctri + 1
2: s← ctri
3: pisi .pid← j
4: pisi .ρ← role
5: pisi .ek ← KE.EPKeyGen(λ)
6: pisi .psk ← PSKi[j]
7: return (i, s)
Send(i, s,m):
1: if pisi = ⊥ then
2: return ⊥
3: else
4: pisi .mr ← pisi .mr‖m
5: (pisi ,m
′)← KE.f(λ, pki, ski, pisi ,m)
6: pisi .ms ← pisi .ms‖m′
7: pisi .T ← pisi .T‖m‖m′
8: return m′
9: end if
Reveal(i, s):
1: if (pisi .α 6= accept) then
2: return ⊥
3: else
4: RSKflagi[s]← corrupt
5: return pisi .k
6: end if
CreatePSK(i, j):
1: if (i = j) ∨ (PSKflagi[j] 6= ⊥)
then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: (psk, pskid)← KE.PSKeyGen(λ)
5: PSKi[j]← (psk, pskid)
6: PSKj [i]← (psk, pskid)
7: PSKflagi[j],PSKflagj [i]← clean
8: if pskid 6= ∅ then
9: return pskid
10: else
11: return >
12: end if
CorruptPSK(i, j):
1: if PSKi[j] = ⊥ then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: if PSKflagi[j] 6= clean then
5: return ⊥
6: else
7: PSKflagi[j]← corrupt
8: PSKflagj [i]← corrupt
9: return PSKi[j]
10: end if
CorruptEPK(i, s):
1: EKflagi[s]← corrupt
2: return pisi .ek
CorruptASK(i):
1: ASKflagi ← corrupt
2: return ski
Test(i, s):
1: if (tested = true) ∨ (pisi .α 6=
accept) ∨ (pisi = ⊥) then
2: return ⊥
3: end if
4: tested← true
5: if b = 0 then
6: return pisi .k
7: else
8: return k
$← K
9: end if
Fig. 2: eCK-PFS-PSK experiment for adversary A against the key-
indistinguishability security of protocol KE.
– α ∈ {active, accept, reject,⊥} – the current status of the session, ini-
tialised with ⊥.
– k ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} – the computed session key, or ⊥ if no session key has yet
been computed.
– ek ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} – the ephemeral key pair used by the session
during protocol execution, initialised as ⊥.
– psk ∈ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ ∪ {⊥} – the preshared secret and identifier used by
the session during protocol execution, initialised as ⊥.
– st ∈ {0, 1}∗ – any additional state used by the session during protocol exe-
cution.
Finally, the challenger manages the following set of corruption registers,
which hold the leakage of secrets that A has revealed.
– preshared keys {PSKflag1,PSKflag2, . . . , PSKflagnP } where for each ele-
ment PSKflagi[j] ∈ PSKflagi, PSKflagi[j] ∈ {corrupt, clean,⊥} ∀ i, j ∈
[nP ] and PSKflagi[j] = ⊥ for i = j
– long-term keys {ASKflag1, . . . ,ASKflagnP }, where ASKflagi ∈ {corrupt,
clean, ⊥} ∀ i ∈ [nP ]
– ephemeral keys {EPKflag1, . . . ,EPKflagnP }, where EPKflagi[s] ∈ {corrupt,
clean, ⊥} ∀ i ∈ [nP ] and s ∈ [nS ].
– session keys {RSKflag1, . . . ,RSKflagnP }, where RSKflagi[s] ∈ {corrupt,
clean, ⊥} ∀ i ∈ [nP ] and s ∈ [nS ].
We formalise the advantage of a PPT algorithm A in winning the
eCK-PFS-PSK key indistinguishability experiment in the following way:
Definition 2 (eCK-PFS-PSK Key Indistinguishability). Let KE be a key-
exchange protocol, and nP , nS ∈ N. For a particular given predicate clean, and
a PPT algorithm A, we define the advantage of A in the eCK-PFS-PSK key-
indistinguishability game to be:
AdveCK-PFS-PSK,cleanKE,nP ,nS ,A (λ) = |Pr[Exp
eCK-PFS-PSK,clean
KE,nP ,nS ,A (λ) = 1]−
1
2
|.
We say that KE is eCK-PFS-PSK-secure if, for all A, AdveCK-PFS-PSK,cleanKE,nP ,nS ,A (λ) is
negligible in the security parameter λ.
4.2 Adversarial Interaction
Our security model is intended to be as generic as possible, in order to capture
eCK-like security notions, but to also include long-term preshared keys. This
would allow our model to be used in analysing (for example) the Signal protocol,
where users exchange both long-term Diffie-Hellman keyshares used in many
protocol executions, but also many ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keyshares that are
only used within a single session. Another example would be TLS 1.3, where users
may have established preshared keys to reduce the protocol’s computational
overheads, or to enable 0-RTT confidential data transmission.
Our attacker is a standard key-exchange model adversary, in complete control
of the communication network, able to modify, inject, delete or delay messages.
They can also compromise several layers of secrets:
– long-term private keys, modelling the misuse or corruption of long-term
secrets in other sessions, and additionally allowing our model to capture
forward-secrecy notions.
– ephemeral private keys, modelling the use of bad randomness generators.
– preshared symmetric keys, modelling the leakage of shared secrets, poten-
tially due to the misuse of the preshared secret by the partner, or the forced
later revelation of these keys.
– session keys, modelling the leakage of keys by their use in bad cryptographic
algorithms.
The adversary interacts with the challenger via the queries below. An algo-
rithmic description of how the challenger responds is in Figure 2.
– Create(i, j, role)→ {(i, s),⊥}: allows the adversary to begin new sessions.
– CreatePSK(i, j) → {pskid,>,⊥}: allows the adversary to direct parties to
generate a preshared key for use in future protocol executions.
– Reveal(i, s): allows the adversary access to the secret session key computed
by a session during protocol execution.
– CorruptPSK(i) → {psk,⊥}: allows the adversary access to the secret pre-
shared key jointly shared by parties prior to protocol execution.
– CorruptASK(i) → {ski,⊥}: allows the adversary access to the secret long-
term key generated by a party prior to protocol execution.
– CorruptEPK(i, s)→ {ek,⊥}: allows the adversary access to the secret ephemeral
key generated by a session during protocol execution.
– Send(i, s,m) → {m′,⊥}: allows the adversary to send messages to sessions
for protocol execution and receive their output.
– Test(i, s) → {k,⊥}: sends the adversary a real-or-random session key used
in determining the success of A in the key-indistinguishability game.
4.3 Partnering Definitions
In order to evaluate which secrets the adversary is able to reveal without triv-
ially breaking the security of the protocol, key-exchange models must define
how sessions are partnered. Otherwise, an adversary would simply run a proto-
col between two sessions, faithfully delivering all messages, Test the first session
to receive the real-or-random key, and Reveal the session partner’s key. If the
keys are equal, then the Test key is real, and otherwise the session key has
been sampled randomly. BR-style key-exchange models traditionally use match-
ing conversations in order to do this. When introducing the eCK-PFS model,
Cremers and Feltz [10] used the relaxed notion of origin sessions.
However, both of these are still too restrictive for analysing WireGuard, be-
cause this protocol does not explicitly authenticate the full transcript. Instead,
for WireGuard, we are concerned matching only on a subset of the transcript
information – the honest contributions of the keyshare and key-derivation mate-
rials. We introduce the notion of contributive keyshares to capture this intuition.
Definition 3 (Contributive keyshares). Recall that pisi .kid is the concatena-
tion of all keyshare material sent by the session pisi during protocol execution.
We say that pitj is a contributive keyshare session for pi
s
i if pi
t
j .kid is a substring
of pisi .mr.
This definition is protocol specific because pisi .kid is: in WireGuard pi
s
i .kid
consists only of the long-term public Diffie-Hellman value and the ephemeral
public Diffie-Hellman value provided by the initiator and responder; in TLS 1.3
(for example) it would consist of the long-term public keys, the ephemeral public
Diffie-Hellman values and any preshared key identifiers provided by the client
and selected by the server.
4.4 Cleanness Predicates
We now define the exact combinations of secrets that an adversary is allowed to
leak without trivially breaking the protocol. The original cleanness predicate of
Cremers and Feltz [10] allows the reveal of long-term secrets for the test session’s
party Pi at any time, which places us firmly in the setting where the adversary
has key-compromise-impersonation abilities, but only allowed the reveal of long-
term secrets of the intended peer after the test session has established a secure
session, which captures perfect forward secrecy.
We now turn to modifying the cleanness predicate cleaneCK-PFS-PSK for the
preshared secret setting.
Definition 4 (cleaneCK-PFS-PSK). A session pi
s
i such that pi
s
i .α = accept in the
security experiment defined in Figure 2 is cleaneCK-PFS-PSK if all of the following
conditions hold:
1. The query Reveal(i, s) has not been issued.
2. For all (j, t) ∈ nP × nS such that pisi is a contributive keyshare session for
pitj, the query Reveal(j, t) has not been issued.
3. If PSKflagi[pi
s
i .pid] = corrupt or pi
s
i .psk = ⊥, the queries CorruptASK(i)
and CorruptEPK(i, s) have not both been issued.
4. If PSKflagi[pi
s
i .pid] = corrupt or pi
s
i .psk = ⊥, and for all (j, t) ∈ nP × nS
such that pitj is a contributive keyshare session for pi
s
i , then CorruptASK(j, t)
and CorruptEPK(j, t) have not both been issued.
5. If there exists no (j, t) ∈ nP × nS such that pitj is a contributive keyshare
session for pisi , CorruptASK(j) has not been issued before pi
s
i .α← accept.
We specifically forbid the adversary from revealing the long-term and ephemeral
secrets if the preshared secret between the test session and its intended partner
has already been revealed. Since preshared keys are optional in our framework,
we also must consider the scenario where a preshared secret does not exist be-
tween the test session pisi and its intended partner. Similarly, we forbid the ad-
versary from revealing the long-term and ephemeral secrets if there exists no
preshared secret between the two parties. Finally, since WireGuard does not
authenticate the full transcript, but relies instead on implicit authentication of
derived session keys based on secret information, we must use our contributive
keyshare partnering definition instead of the origin sessions of [10]. Like eCK-PFS,
we capture perfect forward secrecy under key-compromise-impersonation attack
in condition 5, where the long-term secret of the test session’s intended partner
is allowed to be revealed only after the test session has accepted. Additionally,
we allow for the optional incorporation of preshared secrets in conditions 3 and
4, where the adversary falls back to eCK-PFS leakage paradigm if the preshared
secret between the test session and its peer either does not already exist, or has
been already revealed.
5 Security Analysis
In this section we examine the security implications of modelling the WireGuard
handshake as a 1-RTT key exchange protocol. We have already noted that this
results in a KCI attack on the protocol, also observed in [11]. However, we note
an arguably more serious attack on session key security in our eCK-PFS-PSK se-
curity model that results from this modelling. We discuss the implications of this
attack in Section 5.1. Making minor modifications to the WireGuard handshake
protocol will allow us to prove key-indistinguishability security in the strong
eCK-PFS-PSK model. Specifically, we will add a key-confirmation message gen-
erated by the initiator. We describe the modified WireGuard handshake protocol
in Section 5.2 and prove it secure in Section 5.3.
5.1 Attack on Forward-Secrecy Notions
We briefly describe an attack on WireGuard as a 1-RTT protocol that is allow-
able within the eCK-PFS-PSK security model. It uses the ability of the adversary
to target perfect forward secrecy combined with key-compromise-impersonation
and results in full session key recovery. Specifically, it allows the adversary to
corrupt the long-term key of a responder session, and thus impersonate any
party initiating a session to the corrupted party. Since we model WireGuard
as a 1-RTT key exchange protocol, we do not include the data transport mes-
sage that would otherwise authenticate the initiator to a responder session, and
thus the responder has to accept the session as soon as the responder has sent
the ResponderHello message (this being the last message in the 1-RTT version
of the protocol). Afterwards, the adversary is permitted to corrupt the long-
term key of the party that it is impersonating. This enables it to compute the
session key, and thus distinguish real session keys from random ones, breaking
eCK-PFS-PSK key indistinguishability. The exact details of this attack within
the eCK-PFS-PSK security model can be found in the full version [14].
Readers may argue that this attack is implausible in a real-world setting, and
is entirely artificial, allowable only because of the severe key compromises per-
mitted in the security model. We tend to agree, and present the attack here only
as a means of illustrating that the WireGuard handshake protocol, as originally
presented in its 1-RTT form, is not only vulnerable to standard KCI attacks,
but also to key recovery attacks, and therefore not directly amenable to strong
security proofs without incorporating additional messages as part of the hand-
shake.
5.2 The Modified WireGuard Handshake
Initiator Responder
(x, gx)
$← DHGen, epki ← gx, sidi = IDi $← {0, 1}32
ltk = AEAD(κ3, 0, g
u, H3)
now ← Timestamp()
time← AEAD.Enc(κ4, 0, H4, now)
InitiatorHello: type‖03‖sidi‖epki‖ltk‖time‖mac1‖mac2
InitiatorHello
(y, gy)
$← DHGen, epkr ← gy, sidr = IDr $← {0, 1}32
zero← AEAD.Enc(κ9, 0, H9, ∅)
ResponderHello← type‖03‖sidr‖sidi‖epkr‖zero‖mac1‖mac2
ResponderHello
C10, κ10 ← KDF(C9, ∅)
conf← AEAD.Enc(κ10, 0, H10, ∅)
mac1← MAC(H(label3‖gv), type‖03‖sidi‖sidr‖conf)
mac2← MAC(cookie, type‖03‖sidi‖sidr‖conf‖mac1)
SenderConf← type‖03‖sidi‖sidr‖conf‖mac1‖mac2
SenderConf
tki ← KDF(C10, ∅, 1)
tkr ← KDF(C10, ∅, 2)
Fig. 3: The modification to the WireGuard handshake that allows eCK-PFS-PSK
security. The change is limited to an additional SenderConf message that con-
tains the value conf ← AEAD(κ10, 0, H10, ∅). Except for the computation of
the new C10, κ10 values, all values are computed as in the original WireGuard
handshake protocol, and can be found in Table 1.
We note that in [11], the protection for a responder against KCI attacks is
to wait for authenticated data transport messages to arrive from the initiator.
Incorporating this into the WireGuard handshake would make it impossible to
prove it secure with respect to a key indistinguishability security notion, however,
because the session keys, being used in the data transport protocol, would no
longer remain indistinguishable from random when the subject of a Test query.
As explained in the introduction, there are two basic ways of surmounting
this obstacle: consider the protocol (handshake and data transport) as a mono-
lithic whole, or modify the protocol. We adopt the latter approach, and present
a modification to the WireGuard handshake protocol that allows us to prove
notions of perfect forward secrecy and defence against key-compromise imper-
sonation attacks. Figure 3 shows the modified protocol, denoted mWG. It adds
a key-confirmation message sent from the initiator to the responder, computed
using an extra derived key κ10 used solely for this purpose.
Our modifications are minor (involving at most 5 extra symmetric key op-
erations) and do not require an additional round trip before either party can
begin sending transport data, as the responder was already required to wait for
initiator-sent data before it was able to begin safely sending its own.
5.3 Security of the Modified WireGuard Handshake
This section is dedicated to proving our main result:
Theorem 1. The modified WireGuard handshake protocol mWG is eCK-PFS-PSK-
secure with cleanness predicate cleaneCK-PFS-PSK (capturing perfect forward se-
crecy and resilience to KCI attacks). That is, for any PPT algorithm A against
the eCK-PFS-PSK key-indistinguishability game (defined in Figure 2)
AdveCK-PFS-PSKmWG,cleaneCK-PFS-PSK,nP ,nS ,A(λ) is negligible under the prf, auth-aead,
sym-ms-PRFODH, sym-mm-PRFODH and ddh assumptions.
Due to space constraints, we point readers to the full version of this work
[14] for a more detailed security statement, as well as full details of the proof.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We gave a description of the WireGuard protocol, and demonstrated that it
has an implicit entanglement of its data transport phase and its key exchange
(or handshake) phase. This is needed to ensure protection against KCI attacks.
In turn this means that WireGuard either cannot be proven secure as a key
exchange protocol using standard key-indistinguishability notions, or it is vul-
nerable to key-recovery attacks in the KCI setting. Despite this issue, we believe
that the design of WireGuard protocol is an interesting one, and our attack is
intended more to make a subtle point about the need to cleanly separate a key
exchange protocol and the usage of its session keys in subsequent protocols.
We presented the eCK-PFS-PSK security model. This amends the previous
eCK-PFS model of [10] to cover key exchange protocols such as WireGuard that
combine preshared keys with long-term and ephemeral keys. We then made a
minimal set of modifications to the WireGuard handshake protocol, and proved
that the modified WireGuard protocol achieves key-indistinguishability security
in our new (and strong) eCK-PFS-PSK model.
Other approaches to analysing WireGuard may also be rewarding. Instead of
separately establishing the security of the handshake and assuming it securely
composes with the data transport phase, one could imagine making a monolithic
analysis similar to the ACCE approach introduced in [16]. However, this would
require a different “record layer” modelling from that used for TLS in [16] to
allow for packet loss and packet reordering. One could also implement our modi-
fication and measure its effect on the performance of WireGuard, but we expect
it to be very small.
Finally, we made certain simplifications to simplify our analysis of Wire-
Guard. For instance we did not model the Cookie Reply messages that are de-
signed to protect peers that are under load, nor did we analyse WireGuard’s
key rotation mechanisms. Given its several attractive properties, WireGuard is
certainly deserving of further formal security analysis.
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